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Teodora Lađić 
The Impact of European Integration on the 
Westphalian Concept of National Sovereignty 
 
Introduction  
After World War II, the creation of unprecedented international 
organization for controlling production of coal and steel in 1951, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the understanding of the 
concept of national sovereignty would never be framed in the same manner 
as before. Throughout the process of European integration, the dilemmas 
over preserving or pooling sovereignty were in focus in respect to the 
constant interplay of intergovernmental or supranational approaches of 
constructing institutional and legal architecture of the Communities later, 
the European Union (EU). Hence, Member States, especially larger ones 
were very keen on retaining their sovereignty vis-à-vis European 
institutions, which on the other hand, intended to enhance integration in a 
wide range of fields through centralizing power at the core of the Union. 
Nevertheless, the strong stance of leading supranational institutions, such 
as the European Commission (EC) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), with the help of continuously questioning Member States, has led to 
formation of a solid European Union which aims to provide one voice in 
the world regarding range of issues, while at the same time ensuring 
wealth, peace, stability and progress among European citizens. Thus, while 
allowing and giving more discretion to the institutions of the EU, Member 
States have by default given up some parts of their sovereignty, and the 
question here is to what extent and how it is manifested? Does it mean that 
the concept of national sovereignty has changed? Recent crises have again 
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cast light on this specific issue, which has always been present, but which 
has erupted mostly with the emergence of challenging times in the 
European integration process. The financial crisis that hit Eurozone still has 
enormous implications on EU’s financial governance system and 
mechanisms, as well as a visible impact on the substance and nature of 
national sovereignty and the balance between EU institutions and Member 
States. Hence, not only did the aftermath of the financial crisis have an 
effect on the sovereignty, but it also affected the pace of European 
integration.1Moreover, populism, the refugee crisis, terrorism and Brexit 
have all deeply influenced the erosion of the idea of a unified Europe and 
have strengthened the need for preservation and return of strong 
sovereignty within a strong state. 
We must not forget the period in which we are living, because only by 
understanding and analyzing the context will it be possible to argue a 
resurgence of sovereignty and the level of impact of European integration. 
The post-modern era and globalized inter-dependent world force us to 
contemplate in different manner, where global issues are only possible to 
be resolved by cooperation and deeper integration that largely extends the 
boundaries of national system and its framework of operating. Thus, it is 
crucial to understand that, in such an environment, the European Union 
must be formed on important elements of cooperation, negotiation, 
integration and compromise. This structure must be based on pluralism in 
order for all Member States to be satisfied and have equal voice. Moreover, 
in order to be able to sustain such system, it is necessary to organize 
legitimate transfer of sovereignty in order to be capable of adapting to the 
requirements of globalization on basis of shared values and interests deeply 
founded on the Treaties, so that all members are on board.2 
 
1  Venizelos, Evangelos, State Transformation and the European Integration Project: 
Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm, CEPS, February 2016, 
online at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/state-transformation-and-european-
integration-project-lessons-financial-crisis-; last accessed: 27.07.2017. 
2  Conference Report, Europe and sovereignty: Reality, limits and outlook; 
Foundation Robert Schuman, 29th September 2016; online at: http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0410-europe-and-sovereignty-reality-limits-and-
outlook; last accessed: 27.07.2017. 
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Even though, the membership in the European Communities/Union has 
always been on voluntary basis, the complicated issues over primacy of 
competences between Member States and institutions of the Communities 
vested in the concept of sovereignty have been constantly present, 
sometimes jeopardizing further integration. The path of reforms continued 
up until the Lisbon Treaty reform which marked the current period of 
allowing enormous discretion of EU institutions in developing further the 
idea of united in diversity in a wide variety of areas. This has all had an 
enormous impact on issues of Member State sovereignty, some of which 
have been attempting to restore it; by investigating current actions of the 
UK, Hungary and Poland, who strive towards paths of individuality, it 
could be stated that the interplay between pulling or preserving sovereignty 
has been again put to the fore. The core of the paper focuses on the 
different kind of relation that the EU strives to sustain and develop with 
three different countries, which have diverse positions and roles in and with 
the EU. Furthermore, it will be analyzed how that specific relation affects 
these particular countries’ sovereignty, whether we can raise questions of 
transformation of the concept or not.  
Due to the limits of this paper, the study will be centered on analyzing how 
countries have reacted to pulls on sovereignty at the EU level in order to 
bring wealth to its citizens. Germany, Switzerland and Montenegro, all 
have different roles and different levels of integration with the EU, but they 
are all obliged to respect specific conditions or rules if they want to sustain 
or further develop that particular relation. This particular fact brings to the 
fore the implications of the process of European integration through that 
specific relationship (membership obligations, bilateral agreements or 
accession conditionality) on these countries’ sovereignty. By answering 
key research questions posed here, it is considered that it will be able to 
derive conclusions of the state of concept of Westphalian sovereignty in 
21st century where supranational organizations, such as the EU, have strong 
competences. However, the purpose of the paper goes in two directions 
which are mutually dependent; firstly, it is of high interest to examine the 
character of the EU’s system of governance and regulation following the 
changes of Lisbon Treaty, and secondly to analyze the implications of the 
Teodora Lađić 
4 
 
EU’s institutional and legal architecture of arrangements with three 
countries on their sovereignty. The main focus of the analysis will be on 
five key questions: 
1)  How the EU is institutionally and legally framed under Lisbon 
Treaty, since there are claims of loss of sovereignty or at least of its 
transformation? 
2)  Is the EU a unique organization that has captured huge vast of 
Member States’ sovereignty through process of integration, allowing it to 
exercise enormous impact on countries’ setup? 
3)  What are different arrangements that the three countries pursue in 
order to avoid larger transfers of sovereignty and how they approach the 
need to pull sovereignty? 
4)  How visible is the impact of European integration on German, Swiss 
and Montenegrin sovereignty, if it exists, and does it modify the 
Westphalian model of sovereignty? 
5)  Have we come to the era of a post-Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty; if so, how can we assess the transition into looser forms of 
sovereignty on a gains and losses spectrum? 
It is crucial to explain the notion of Westphalian sovereignty and the 
concept of European integration, as it will be then possible to further 
develop idea of the impact of European integration on national sovereignty, 
understood under the Westphalian system, which would allow us to make a 
comparison with current state of sovereignty, deprive final conclusions and 
confirm or reject the starting hypothesis. 
“The Westphalian sovereignty is defined as an imminent characteristic of a state, 
and no other unit, higher or lower, can become a sovereign but a state. When a 
state ceases to exist, its sovereignty also ends. And, contrarily, it emerges when a 
new state comes into a being. The existence of a plurality of sovereign structures 
on one territory is in this approach unthinkable.”3 
No matter how vintage this definition seems, it lasted for many years after 
Westphalian Peace was established in 1648 in Münster and Osnabrück 
 
3  Hamulak, Ondrej, National Sovereignty in the European Union-View from the 
Czech Perspective, Springer International, Cham, 2016: 55. 
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following the Thirty Years War. It confirmed the supremacy of state power 
over specifically defined territories and created a system of equal states. 
The question is how stable this definition could be in today’s world of 
interdependence and broad range of state and non-state actors with varieties 
of competences. If we consider the EU, the abolition of internal borders, 
the creation of a supranational legal system and the appearance of a 
European demos, opposes and departs notably from classical notion of 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the concept of European integration has 
been widely used in many studies, although very little has been explained. 
Integration as a notion is a fluid concept and it comprises many things in a 
very long period of time; this could be said from the creation of first 
Communities, where contextual circumstances and inter-play of different 
factors interfered in its creation. In the White Paper, recently formed by 
European Commission, Robert Schuman’s statement has been recalled, 
which perfectly explains:  
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built 
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”4  
The only plausible definition that could be found is the one offered in the 
Oxford dictionary which states that: 
“European integration is the formation of European states into the world’s closest 
regional association, which has assumed many of the characteristics of the 
statehood.” 
However, European integration is a process of constant and diversified 
economic, social, cultural and political integration of large, medium-sized 
and small states into complex network of interchangeable system, on top of 
which supranational institutions govern in its exclusive competences, 
covered by subsidiarity among different layers. The implications of ever 
closer Union require seeing integration through a mirror of deepening and 
widening processes, which require more diversified angles of research.  
The explicit setting of the hypothesis is crucial for the purpose of the paper 
and for creating scientific added value. The key argument here is that, 
throughout the years, European integration has had enormous impact on the 
 
4  White Paper on the Future of Europe – Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 
2025, European Commission, March 2017: 4. 
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Westphalian concept of national sovereignty in terms of adjusting it and 
transforming to the contemporary situation, allowing for different actors to 
participate in decision-making processes. The main aim of the paper is to 
contribute to the comprehensive research on this topic, from a different 
angle and to bring added value while answering the research questions 
posed. Due to limitations of this paper, analysis will focus on three states 
which have different connection with the EU system and which will allow 
us to understand the plethora of this specific issue. Also, it is vital to 
present, for methodological reasons, a brief summary of the following 
chapters. In the first chapter, the intention is to explain key elements of the 
EU’s institutional, legal and political architecture, to find the reasons as to 
whether it could be considered as differentia specifica and, if we come to 
the conclusion that is unique, to find the implications to the notion of 
state’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the second chapter focuses on the German 
Constitution, as the best indicator of one country’s sovereignty, to show 
how Germany tried to adjust it, mostly through its Federal Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation, in order to be able to acquire all the obligations of 
EU membership and the growing transfer of sovereignty in different fields. 
The third chapter, deals with the specific relationship between the EU and 
Switzerland, which is unique comparing to the broad range of EU 
correspondence with third countries, but gives a clear example of how, 
even those countries who tried to avoid surrendering parts of its 
sovereignty, in the end must do it in order to receive the benefits from 
participating in some EU activities. Finally, fourth chapter will deal with 
young, small, but decisive country-Montenegro, and will try to explain the 
process of accession to the EU and how the EU affects the sovereignty of 
the acceding countries through the framework of conditionality. 
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1. Post-Lisbon architecture of the EU – differentia 
specifica and issue of national sovereignty 
The aim of this chapter is not to introduce some specific sort of a grand 
theory and discussion about the characteristics of the EU, but to provide 
factual aspects of uniqueness and special features that the EU upholds 
considering thoughts of both Euro-advocates and Euro-skeptics and further 
relating it to the issue of national sovereignty, analyzing whether that 
particular structure has an influence on the traditional concept of 
Westphalian sovereignty. In more general terms, the intention is to 
establish difference in the EU operation from other similar organizations 
and to deprive conclusions in respect to the functioning of the state today- 
the multitude actors, in comparison to the world of dominant countries 
under the Westphalian system of governance. 
Hence, it has been established that in globalized world countries are 
undeniably forced to transfer and abandon to some extent their sovereignty, 
pressured by factors of interdependence in all spheres of life. Interestingly, 
to be sovereign and to be dependent are not contradictory conditions – 
which has been proven through integration processes within the EU system, 
where countries, in order to compensate loss of independency in 
conducting policies, have transferred parts of sovereignty to the EU 
institutions in order to attain greater importance in the international scene.5 
If we look at all 28 (27) Member States of the EU, we must be assured that 
Italy or France does not resemble Nebraska of the United States in 
federalist terms; this has been acknowledged many times through different 
referendums during Maastricht, Nice or Lisbon approval procedure. On the 
other hand, it is not possible to reject that the EU has established a new era 
of understanding the role of the State due to the fact that around 70-80% of 
the, mostly economic regulations, Article 3, Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU), comes from the EU and are incorporated in national 
 
5  The EU and Member States Sovereignty, AALEP, 2016, online at: 
http://www.aalep.eu/eu-and-member-states-sovereignty; last accessed: 27.07.2017. 
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systems. 6  However, the organization that was established in the 1952 
brought constant frictions and inter-play between supranational forces and 
preservation of national sovereignty and confirmed that fundamentals 
known at that date would be transformed to its core.7 The uniqueness of the 
EU could be found in its institution-organizational structures where in 
comparison to other organizations, a multitude of different players on 
different layers bound by distinctive decision-making arrangements 
construct the mere essence of what the EU is. Furthermore, the EU in its 
corpus provides and sustains a broad range of competences which in some 
areas implicitly, while in others explicitly show the supranational 
characteristics of its internal processes.8  
One of the key features that forms a distinctive part inherent to the EU is 
the level of the power transferred to the European supranational institutions 
in spheres which were previously thoroughly regulated on the national 
level. Not only do supranational institutions (such as European 
Commission and European Court of Justice, mostly) have the ability to 
enrich the regulatory system of the EU by adopting a wide specter of policy 
documents with binding force, but they also have jurisdiction over 
implementing measures which commit Member States and other actors to 
comply with rules and conditions laid down, unlike many other 
international organizations. Of course, we cannot argue that parts of 
countries’ sovereignty have been transferred to the institutions of the EU 
only in order to attain specific goals and that is also what creates the 
differentia specifica of the EU. 
More specifically, if we go in depth and analyze the particular 
supranational institutions of the EU we would be able to understand why 
 
6  Llorente, R. ,Francisco, Constitutionalism in the “Integrated” States of Europe, 
Jean Monnet Center for International and regional Economic Law & Justice, 2014; 
online at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/98/98-5-.html; last 
accessed: 27.07.2017. 
7  Bosoni, Adriano, Sovereignty, Supranationality and the Future of the EU 
Integration; Stratfor WorldView, 2013; online at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/ 
weekly/sovereignty-supranationality-and-future-eu-integration; last accessed: 
28.07.2017. 
8  Nugent, Neill, The Government and Politics of the European Union, MacMillan 
Press LTD, Fourth Edition, London, 1999: 521-522.  
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they are so different from institutions we see in other organizations or even 
in states. The European Commission has been considered as an institution 
which has central role in accomplishing greater integration among Member 
States and in representing the EU with one supranational voice. Hence, 
Member States have transferred to it some key functions of framing the 
decision-making process through initiating proposal measures, executing 
EU policies through specific mechanisms in particularly defined areas, and 
providing a comprehensive framework of compliance procedures for 
Member States to safeguard the provisions from the Treaties. Furthermore, 
the ECJ as Supreme Court of the EU has had very important role to set 
precedents by interpreting provisions of the EU legislative corpus and 
assuring that they are applied accordingly to the highest law – the Treaties. 
In the end, we must not forget the European Parliament (EP), which has 
witnessed growing influence in the decision-making process, positioning 
itself side by side to the Council, having competence in shaping and 
adopting budget, and supervisory competence through mechanism to 
control the Commission and appoint or dismiss it; strengthening its role 
within reforms under the Lisbon Treaty allowing for a higher level of 
democratic legitimization of EU actions as the only directly elected body. It 
is visible from above, that these institutions-modernly called supranational 
by neofunctionalist scholars- have enormous discretionary rights and enjoy 
significant independence and sovereignty from Member States and their 
governments in exercising their competences.9 Interestingly, some argue 
that the mere transfer or delegation of specific jurisdiction or competence 
does not mean that sovereignty is transferred as well, due to the 
circumstance that States still preserve all power in their hands and are able 
at any time to exercise it if national interest is at stake. The foundational 
presupposition of the EU is pragmatic sovereignty, which implies that it 
could be withdrawn any time. However, the EU has constructed such a 
complex and indispensable system that absorbs different kind of actors, 
 
9  Tallberg, Jonas, European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making 
States Comply, Routledge, Abingdon, 2003: 2-14. 
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dragging them into a framework which must shape them and change in 
entirety or partially.10 
The form and material of the EU as we know it today is established on 
grounds of Treaty revision made in Lisbon, capital of Portugal, following 
the failed attempt to create Constitution of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty 
(entered into force in 2009) amended the previous Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) with 
goals of improving democracy and efficiency of decision-making process, 
providing firmer, simpler, faster and united adoption of crucial decisions. 
Important modifications of the Lisbon Treaty are mostly transposed from 
the Constitutional Treaty, leaving behind all provisions which had federal 
connotations and symbolized construction of the EU as having state 
features. Thus, the abolishment of the famous Maastricht pillar structure 
and creating the function of President of the European Council and High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy aimed at strengthening the 
EU position on the international stage and providing personification of 
unified voice in two positions among its Member States. However, one 
significant leap towards full-fledge Union in conducting its competences is 
considered to be the introduction of specific clause in the Treaty on the 
European Union which allows it to have legal personality, meaning even 
more detaching sovereignty from its Member States. But, fortunately or 
not, it still lacks the power of sword and power of purse, by not having 
competence to extend its power towards fiscal policies and lacks stronger 
enforcement mechanisms. However, the system of the EU under the Treaty 
of Lisbon, more accurately, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU) and Treaty on the European Union (TEU), is not constrained only 
on some specific, narrowly defined economic spheres and organized in 
limited and distributive manner through different layers. Currently the EU 
has continually broadened its powers, in metaphorical terms behaving like 
octopus and stretching its tentacles to every possible area and sector. 
Indeed, it moved from regulating organizational functions within systems 
to influencing and shaping the everyday life of ordinary citizens of the 
 
10  Hayward, Jack/Wurzel, Rüdiger, European Disunion: Between Sovereignty and 
Solidarity, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2012: 65-68. 
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EU’s Member States and beyond; inevitably bound by principles of 
proportionality, conferral and subsidiarity (Article 5, TEU) as crucial 
clauses which constrain and mould every action made by EU institutions.11 
If we take into consideration the configuration of the EU’s institutions, we 
would come to a conclusion that not all institutions share the principle of 
equal representation in order to respect countries’ sovereignty and confirm 
that each country in the EU is same and has equal rights and obligations. 
Addressing the issue of the influence on national sovereignty exercised by 
institutions of the EU cannot pass without paying attention on questions of 
representation, arrangement of voting system and degree of influence on 
European legislation. According to that, the EU Council, EC and ECJ are 
institutions which respect the principle of equal representation and more or 
less equal voting rights if we calculate majority of policies where decisions 
of members are made, as well as taking into consideration the specific 
features of each institution.  
But, on the other hand, in the EP and the Council, the seats in the previous 
and votes in the later are assigned according to a country’s population, 
creating huge discrepancies between countries – where one country could 
be stronger and could override smaller in important decisions, while 
constraining the sovereign right to decide on equal footing.12 
The proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as binding and 
making it part of the primary law system according to which all other 
legislative acts adopted by Member States and EU’s institutions must be in 
accordance, is one of the greatest improvements brought by reforming 
Lisbon Treaty. Hence, following this novelty many issues with national 
systems of protection of human rights guaranteed by Constitutions have 
arisen. Furthermore, extending the competence of the EU in the field of 
home and justice affairs, or more specifically under Title V of TFEU the 
 
11  D’Atena, Antonio, The European Union After Lisbon: Constitutional basis, 
Economic Order and External Action, Springer, 2012: 58-61. 
12  Lancaster University, Does Membership to the European Union undermine 
national sovereignty? 2015: 6-7; online at: https://cogitariumlancaster.files. 
 wordpress.com/2012/06/does-membership-of-the-eu-undermine-national-
sovereignty.pdf; last accessed: 28.07.2017. 
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area of freedom, security and justice, highlighted the penetration of EU 
norms in a field previously reserved for Member States; by improving the 
cooperation in specifically defined areas of judicial and police cooperation 
in criminal and civil matters, as well as joint system of collaboration in 
border checks, immigration and asylum. 
An enormous impact on the constellation of relations within the EU 
institutional structure and functional mechanism is the extension of 
qualified majority voting and by default the diminishing use of veto in 
Council of Ministers, which theoretically and practically limits Member 
State sovereignty in terms that they must comply with policies and legal 
acts adopted without their consent. Moreover, in conjunction with that, the 
increase in power of supranational institutions is a source of major 
limitation to national sovereignty; thus, the EC has significantly increased 
its influence on certain policy outcomes mostly in respect to the EU Single 
Market, on the other hand, the EP has strengthen its position in ordinary 
legislative procedure in respect to wide range of policy areas.13 
Importantly, there is necessity to again stress the role of the Commission 
due to the fact that it is preeminent in all national and international 
institutional structures. This particular institution impact enormously on 
each Member State’s sovereignty because it is centrally included in 
decision-making process in all possible forms. According to Professor 
Nugent, the Commission lies at the heart of the Union due to the 
circumstance that it is only institution capable of providing coherent and 
structured leadership not divided by different national interest. It is 
important to highlight the fact that the Commission does not only have 
competences envisaged in the Treaties, but it has progressively expanded 
responsibilities in accordance with practical developments and necessities 
of the EU system as such; mostly characterized as having impact on 
sovereignty through competences of proposing and developing policies in 
all critical junctures periods and challenges in integration, the Commission 
 
13  AALEP, op. cit. 
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was the driving force in encouraging the continuation of stronger and more 
inclusive Community/Union.14 
Additionally, the legal system grounded by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), using its interpretive power to influence substantially national 
legislative corpus, presently under the Lisbon Treaty gains confirmation of 
autonomy which cannot be compared to any typical international nor 
national system; following that, some legal forms are directly applicable 
and are in position of supremacy from national measures, at the same time 
giving rights and obligations not only to Member States but also to 
individuals (legal or natural) within their systems, which is significant leap 
towards confirming the hypothesis of a modification of the concept of 
national sovereignty.  
Nevertheless, the key fields which are the personification of the Member 
States’ sovereignty are still strongly attached to national government 
jurisdiction. Notably, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policies are those where 
Member States have been careful in promoting further integration by 
transferring limited competence to create in some strict aspects unified 
voice of the EU. However, due to strong significance and impact that these 
policies could have on their sovereignty, the centralization has happened 
only within Council structure, where national representatives have the final 
word. Hence, both areas with questions of sovereignty have strengthened 
the role of executive actors at the expense of judicial or legislative 
institutions.15 On the other hand, if we analyze Articles 101-109 in the 
Treaty on the Functioning on the EU (TFEU), we would without any 
doubts conclude that the EU has enormous discretionary rights given by the 
Lisbon reforms, to monitor, investigate and sanction not only Member 
States, but also companies and even beyond to the extent that its 
competences apply to firms that only operate on EU territory but come 
from third countries (competition policy). 
 
14  Nugent, op. cit., 101-123. 
15  Stetter, Stephan, EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross pillar politics and the 
social construction of sovereignty, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007: 1-10. 
Teodora Lađić 
14 
 
In order to be able to understand the real implication of Lisbon reform on 
the structure of the EU and on national sovereignty, it is necessary to stress 
that the provisions envisaged, especially in TFEU, show that Member 
States have secured enough rights to constrain further uncontrolled 
expansion of EU competencies. More specifically, the measures to invoke 
an action of annulment against measures adopted by the EU institutions 
under the Article 263, as well as, failure to act Article 265 and Union 
liability under Article 268, TFEU, have the explicit intention to safeguard 
national sovereignty from free interpretation of conferral principle. 
Crucially, under Article 4, Treaty on the European Union (TEU), secured 
the idea that the masters of the further integration process are still the 
Member States, as EU institutions must respect essential functions of each 
Member State. Moreover, the role of national parliaments is strengthened 
through yellow and orange mechanisms in ordinary legislative procedure, 
allowing the increased inclusion of national controlling mechanisms; thus 
certifying that under the Lisbon Treaty the EU is still considered partially 
as a federal entity with high constrains held by Member States.16 
Nevertheless, the inclination of Member States in a majority of policy areas 
to sustain and foster interest of the EU as a whole, more eagerly than 
national interests itself is present. Which brings us to the idea that the EU is 
built up to this point due to the deliberate intention of its Member States 
which see benefits from unified and coherent integration processes and 
have on voluntary basis limited their sovereign capabilities. On the other 
hand, the very important amendment within TEU is Article 50, which 
provides Member States with tools to regain their sovereignty completely 
(if it is possible today in world of globalized forces) through withdrawing 
their membership within the Union. 
In the context of the issue of national sovereignty and changes brought with 
the Lisbon Treaty, it is now possible to argumentatively demonstrate that 
visible and strong erosion can be marked regarding all criteria of the 
sovereign statehood (government, territory, population). Due to profound 
penetration of the EU system, shared, transferred or constrained national 
 
16  Piris, Jean-Claude, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010: 327-329. 
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sovereignty where Member States are no longer fully sovereign, but the EU 
is not a state either, has marked a new post-Westphalian system of 
cohabitation of strong states affected by enormous direct or implicit 
influence from non-state actors.17 
Thus, the EU is undoubtedly a unique and specific entity which cannot be 
compared to any other by mechanisms that engage states in joint action to 
create common polices and formulate binding decisions, strengthening both 
small and large states equally.18 
It would not be an objective analysis if we would prematurely conclude and 
derive some answers to posed research questions or even if we would lead 
same thread through the whole paper arguing that EU integration has 
brought major changes and understanding of sovereignty, without 
examining several issues in following chapters.  
2.  Constitutional law adjustment vis-à-vis pulling of 
sovereignty through membership of the EU – case 
study Germany 
It is necessary to examine whether reforms brought with the Lisbon Treaty 
penetrate the highest expression of Member States’ sovereignty, the 
Constitution and more importantly the interpretation of the Constitutional 
Courts, which make decisions which articulate the path of country’s further 
involvement in EU affairs. The core idea is to use comparative analogy in 
parts where it is necessary to collect more arguments for specific analytical 
thoughts, while involving different Member States with different 
constitutional features in respect to the EU system and comparing it to the 
German Constitutional European structure which is considered to be a 
paradigm for all other countries’ maneuvers in respect to explicitly keeping 
or implicitly delegating more powers to the EU institutions. Hence, a 
number of constitutions have some reference in respect to EU membership 
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and integration, but also usually there are very minimal or implicit 
modifications which lead to possible clashes with the EU legal system due 
to constitutional limits of the further delegation of sovereign powers. 
Following the last enlargement and reform Treaty, the substance of 
constitutional authorization for the European involvement has become 
much more diverse.19 
The constitution is the supreme legal expression of people power and over 
the territory they reside. It defines the relation between different political 
branches and sets fundamental conditions to constrain them and provide 
balance for legitimate exercise of their power. Interestingly, European 
integration alters the balance founded by national constitutions in terms of 
the defined relation among central government, regional and local 
authorities due to special characteristic of the EU to influence a multitude 
of system structures. Because of this it is necessary to provide adequate 
constitutional basis, since the legitimacy of respective states would be 
questioned if these radical changes would be carried out contrary to their 
constitutions. On the other hand, the Union also relies on the well-
articulated constitutional basis in respect to the Europeanization given the 
fact that the power transferred to it by its Member States is based on the 
principle of conferral and that would be impossible to legitimately exercise 
without having support in the constitution by which indirectly it is bound.20 
Until this date, all Member States of the EU have ratified treaties that have 
established or reformed Communities/Union which should imply that the 
defined transfer of competences to the supranational Union level should in 
essential and formal terms be identical. However, the harmonization of 
phrases and legal formulation as the expression of the will to transfer 
specific powers to the institutions of the EU is not visible in Constitutions 
of Member States. Most common are general provisions aiming at 
confirming conformity with partially transfer of competences to 
international organizations. On the other hand, a very limited number of 
constitutional texts have direct reference to the EU. For instance, in Italy 
and France the clear wording for the transfer of competences to the other 
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international entities is the limitation of sovereignty; in Spain the transfer of 
competences for common exercise by the European institutions and lastly 
the transfer of sovereign powers in Germany. If we closely analyze, the key 
concept of modern constitutions is the open statehood which indicates that 
sovereignty is not preserved anymore in terms of Westphalian strong and 
absolute statehood but it is limited and transferred to the degree where we 
cannot argue its abandonment. Implicitly or not, the constitutional setup of 
the Member States form the essential foundation for further European 
integration, the balance of national autonomy and supranationality, which 
indicates the source of stability in the Union.21 
Furthermore, if we take closer look and analyze the period of pre-accession 
in the Central and Eastern Europe Partnerships (CEE) countries and 
compare it to the period of being inside the EU as members, we could 
conclude that huge modifications of constitutional provisions aiming at 
securing larger parts of their sovereignty from being transferred to the EU 
institutions have occurred. Hence, we could state that many countries have 
a huge appetite before entering the EU and promising a lot, but while being 
pushed and outvoted in some areas of policy decision-making, countries 
strive to show that the real strength and sovereignty comes only from the 
states.  
In respect to Germany, several modification of constitutional law exist due 
to several major reforms brought by European integration which require 
more cautious formulation in the Constitution, called Basic Law, following 
a higher degree of unification and extension of the powers towards 
supranational institutions. Hence, direct effect and applicability of the EU 
law as well as its supremacy have been confirmed within the German legal 
system, but not in absolute terms, which was exemplified through many 
judgments brought in regard of preserving constitutional identity by the 
Federal Constitutional Court. Pursuant to the Article 23 in the Basic Law, 
the Federal Republic of Germany is allowed to take part in processes of 
European integration and to perform its role within the Union while 
transferring its sovereign powers to the supranational institutions. This is 
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personification of the open statehood method which has established 
essential elements for profound German integration within the EU system 
and which has opened previously closed system through constraining its 
sovereignty by renouncing the normative exclusivity of national law within 
its territory. Interestingly, famous Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
decisions regarding adjustment of the constitutional framework to newly 
Lisbon Treaty, listed the most significant elements of German heritage 
which cannot be submitted to any kind of delegation to other entities or 
constrained (which was accused of too harsh interpretation of the Basic 
Law normative text preventing further deeper integration within the EU). 
However, those elements, so called finalities in Article 23, describe the 
whole meaning of the German constitutional framework and how to 
transfer power to the EU without endangering the core sovereignty of the 
Federal state; due to their high importance, a few significant lines of this 
paragraph should be devoted to this. First, it is stated that in order to 
respect the traditional concept of open statehood it is necessary to transfer 
defined extent of competence to the EU. Secondly, certain mechanisms 
must be assured to safeguard the proper exercise of the transferred powers 
in respect to the core fundamentals of the democratic, federal and social 
Germany and to the essential principles of subsidiarity and rule of law, 
especially directed to the high protection of human rights at the degree 
provided by the German constitutional system. Thirdly, the eternity clause 
provided by the Basic Law totally forbids any transfer of competence or 
limitation of application of human dignity, democracy, constitutional 
structure, social state and federalism even in formal constitutional reform, 
especially directed towards further integration within the EU framework.22 
The Basic Law clearly states that Germany is an independent and sovereign 
country which cannot be constrained, changed or amended by any other 
constitutional provision. The famous Federal Constitutional Court’s (FCC) 
Maastricht decision sets seven criteria for respecting the above mentioned 
statement in the German Constitution. The foremost important criterion 
which sets conditions for any further element of introduction of 
Europeanized values into constitutional framework, proclaims that the 
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Masters of the Treaties are still Member States and that any change in 
respect of competences for the EU should be subjected to undeniable 
unanimous confirmation from Member States. It further emphasized the 
important role of the Member States’ legal authorities to have jurisdiction 
over interpreting and adjudicating in conflicts of legal systems, due to the 
specific fact that Germany has transferred limited powers which have been 
set in sufficiently clear and foreseeable manner. Interestingly, it was 
defined in the fourth provision of this Maastricht decision that the EU has 
exclusive competences only in economic areas and by default severely 
limiting it to exercise further powers to fields which are characterized to 
have high importance for question of state’s sovereignty such as foreign or 
security policy. Lastly, one paragraph affirms that EU’s democratic 
legitimacy is derived from the national level, notably from the 
constitutional normative texts. 23  It is clearly visible how Germany, 
considered by many as the core of the EU and the driving force of any 
further integrative path, is very begrudgingly saving its sovereignty and 
does not intend to extend EU’s competences in fields where it has the 
inherent right to provide development. The decision brought on June 2009 
in regard to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty which has set the structural 
and legal framework of current EU’s functioning is much more significant; 
the effect of that Treaty as seen in the previous chapter is very substantial 
and should be important to see how Germany and its Federal Constitutional 
Court have reacted in order to secure key constitutional fundaments. 
The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed even more rigorously some of 
the provisions of the Maastricht decision, explicitly stating that people in 
terms of European demos cannot exist due to the clear fact that citizens are 
constituent element of each EU’s Member State, and as such should not be 
considered as citizens of the EU, regardless of the implication of EU 
citizenship. In elaboration of many discussions provoked by this Lisbon 
decision, maybe the most controversial one was raised around the repeated 
confirmation that the EU is nothing but an intergovernmental organization 
which strives to accomplish goals set by its founders, the Member States. 
The exercise of certain powers by German institutions cannot be 
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constrained by further development of the EU, and importantly, the 
obligatory requirement presumes further transfer of the powers to the 
respective EU institutions via German federal parliament. As the final 
provision, which clearly indicates the level of importance to preserve the 
national constitutional identity and by that meaning national sovereignty, 
states if the EU institutions exercise their competences to excess, the worst 
case scenario would apply – meaning that Germany is completely free to 
unilaterally reverse its participation from the EU.24 
In the Lisbon decision, the Federal Constitutional Court has explicitly 
announced its competence in highly important policies for preservation of 
German sovereignty and other fundamentals listed, but on the other hand, it 
also has an obligation to submit the preliminary ruling reference to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and make it familiar with the issue, while 
simultaneously participating in preserving uniformity of interpretation of 
the European legal values. However, due to circumstance that there has 
usually been disagreement between those two courts, the judges have 
developed the special mechanism in the legal jurisprudence, to interpret 
national laws as far as viable in the light of the European legal provisions 
and values, and that this is a special obligation of the Federal Constitutional 
Court.25 
Nevertheless, German legal experts have embodied the constitutional text 
with the reference to the EU membership and have emphasized great 
devotion to the further progress in the European integration process with 
the aim of enhancing values that are common to all people in Germany. It 
is crucial to underline that the moment of becoming part of the EU does not 
mean that automatic loss of the sovereignty is completely under the way, 
but the adjustment. We can undeniably argue that Germany still remains 
the major source of power in the realm of the EU competences and is still 
in charge over its territory, people and system in overall terms. In addition, 
the Federal Constitutional Court confirms that the EU cannot be considered 
as having sovereignty, but it is regarded as the association of the states 
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(Europäischer Staatenverbund) which decides only on matters conferred to 
it by Member States (the only ones enjoying sovereignty).26 
The Lisbon judgment made by the Federal Constitutional Court established 
a visible threat to further development of the European integration process 
in respect to Germany, but it is also dangerous due to the specific role of 
the Germany in the EU and even more in respect to Federal Constitutional 
Court whose decisions usually serve as a model for other constitutional 
courts. Also, how the Federal Constitutional Court has brought its verdict 
in that direction in a country such as Germany is very specific, where 
federalism has played an important role in creating a new history for 
German people in a strong and prosperous country and even more when 
“Länder” as federal units, have a wide range of competences and to some 
extent sovereignty. However, the EU is not only consisted from provisions 
in the Treaties, it is much more beyond it and in that respect interpretation 
of any norms should be conducted with regard to a broader sense of values, 
traditions and practices applied, not only the mere letter in one legal 
act. 27 Thus, the Westphalian concept of national sovereignty is clearly 
abandoned when it comes to Germany, it could be argued due to specific 
features of its participation in the EU. 
“…the return to a view of the state authority of the individual state which regards 
sovereignty as freedom that is organized by international law and committed to it, 
the German Constitution is directed towards opening the sovereign state order to 
peaceful cooperation of the nations and towards European integration.”28 
The significant level of human rights protection brought with Lisbon 
Treaty incorporating the binding Charter of Fundamental Rights has been 
seen as one of the most important achievements in 21st century in realm of 
the EU. Interestingly, this issue has been a stumbling stone in European 
Court of Justice and Federal Constitutional Court relations in terms of 
 
26  Hamulak, op. cit., 3-4; 45-56. 
27  Jansen, Thomas, The German Constitution in the future of the European Union 
after the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty, 
Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 2, issue 1, 2010: 3-7, online at: http://www.on-
federalism.eu/attachments/054_download.pdf; last accessed 29.07.2017. 
28  Federal Constitutional Court Judgment on June 2009, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
online at: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen 
 /EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html; last accessed 29.07.2017. 
Teodora Lađić 
22 
 
supremacy over jurisdiction and involving issues of sovereignty, due to 
decisive and radical Federal Constitutional Court judgments that the 
protection of fundamental rights must be treated the same on the national 
level or more, before the EU legal framework would be put into effect.   
Considering this analysis, typically four issues arise between German 
Federal Constitutional Court and European Court of Justice, but in more 
general terms with other constitutional courts which follow this path. The 
national interpretation of supremacy of the EU legal system, the level of 
fundamental rights protection, as stated above, third issue develops in the 
area of the competence of deciding on the transfer of power on the EU 
level and last the adjustment of the constitutional provisions and values 
with respect to Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). However, the 
Lisbon Treaty brought major reforms and contentious legal discussion, but 
only France has introduced amendments to its Constitution. Some countries 
like Spain, interestingly, are in the process of framing a package of 
modifications for a longer perspective. Thus, none of the member states 
considers that this new reform treaty has significant impact on their 
respective constitutions, as there is no need for any modifications or even 
for questioning the implications on the sovereignty and possibility for 
excessive composition of the treaty provisions.29  
The German constitutional order is considered as friendly and open 
towards the EU system, and the constitutional identity is set outside the 
scope of the EU legal framework, by default the Constitution is considered 
as total, using bottom-up mechanisms to integrate within the EU. 30 
Moreover, for a better understanding of how Germany has reacted to a 
pulling of sovereignty to the EU level, especially in terms of the last reform 
Treaty, another comparative analogy with German the constitutional 
 
29  Lehmann, Wilhelm, The European Democracy, Constitutional identity and 
Sovereignty, European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, 2010: 12-15, online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/425618/IPOL-
AFCO_NT(2010)425618_EN.pdf; last accessed: 29.07.2017. 
30  Schyff, Gerhard, EU Member State Constitutional Identity: A comparison of 
Germany and Netherlands as Polar Opposite, Max-Planck-Institute, 2016: 182-
183, online at: http://www.zaoerv.de/76_2016/76_2016_1_a_167_192.pdf; last 
accessed 29.07.2017. 
The Impact of European Integration on the Westphalian Concept of 
National Sovereignty 
23 
 
system would be useful, utilizing Hungary, a country that relatively 
recently joined the EU in the largest enlargement period of 2004. These 
days it has been a strong advocate for higher expression of national 
sovereignty and jurisdiction supremacy in terms of migration policy and 
education. However, most importantly for this topic is the clause inserted 
by the National Assembly in the Hungarian Constitution in the period of 
anticipation of full-fledged membership where it is precisely stated that 
competences derived from the constitution would be exercised in 
accordance with the European values envisaged in the founding treaties and 
manifested in harmonized approach with other member states. 
Furthermore, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has come to the same 
conclusion in respect to the Lisbon Treaty, that even with certain and 
evident reforms the postulates of independence and sovereignty have not 
been put in danger.31 
Intentionally, the constitutional order of each state has evolved into new 
cohabitation of the forms of supranationality on the one side, and the 
national self-preservation and autonomous constitutional framework, on the 
other. In the so called system of legal pluralism,32it is of crucial importance 
to form such mechanisms which will hold different values and different 
structures under one roof, providing suitable ground for harmonious 
expression of both, while at the same time extracting the best from both, 
keeping their uniqueness in perfect symbiosis.  
Undoubtedly, the European normative corpus has created enormous impact 
on each member state’s constitutional identity, changing the capacity and 
substance from the inside-out of the most important legal act of one 
country, the Constitution. In that respect, it is necessary to quote an 
interesting paragraph of the study conducted by EP’s Directorate General, 
which will perfectly explain the relation between constitutions and EU 
legal order, most notably in terms of analysis of the German constitutional 
framework. 
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”…transformation of the Union into a “governing body” is perceived as an 
intrusion on longstanding traditions and legal autonomy: the domestic constitution 
can no longer fulfill its claim to comprehensively regulate acts of public authority 
on domestic territory. The national constitutions are still relevant when a state 
transfers powers to the EU, but once they are transferred, their exercise is no 
longer determined by the national constitution.”33 
Only a few Member States have brought significant modifications to the 
respective constitutions with reference to the EU as whole, legal order or 
membership, but each of them has specifically defined and constrained the 
extent of the transfer of the powers to the EU institutions. Hence, Germany 
has strongly supported European processes, but has also strictly responded 
to necessity to pull sovereignty on the EU level, keeping it still strongly in 
the realm of national prerogative. Nevertheless, constitutional provisions of 
all Member States have served as the main entrance of the EU legal order 
within national systems, thus it is interesting to analyze the degree of 
influence the EU legal system has on countries which only partially 
participate in European development and integration. 
3. The impact of European integration on third 
countries – how the relationship between the EU and 
Switzerland impacts on Swiss sovereignty? 
Switzerland has been reluctant to membership of the EU and has its own 
unique path engaging in the international environment. Upholding its 
principle of neutrality as a symbol of successful development of the nation 
and country has created a special place in political science analysis. Once 
the Helvetic Republic, nowadays the Swiss Confederation proclaims itself 
as European, but not to the extent to endanger its national sovereignty and 
participate in comprehensive supranational European project; considering 
the huge importance of the EU, Switzerland insists on sustaining and 
incrementally developing a special relationship, which has been built on 
bilateral grounds over the years. Switzerland is a very interesting case in 
comparison to other European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, 
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due to its specific situation that it has never directly applied for full-fledged 
membership of the EU and has never decided to let the people’s will be 
expressed in referendum regarding Swiss integration; unlike Norway, or 
Iceland which began negotiating chapters with the EU, but then withdrew 
its application. This all goes to the strong argument that throughout the 
years different Swiss governments have stood by the aim of sovereignty 
preservation in terms of specific principles envisaged in its constitutional 
framework which, if we look at the evolution of the Swiss-EU relations, 
has not remained intact under the influence of bilateral relations. 
Interestingly, Switzerland is the country more integrated with the EU 
processes than any other third country and to some extent could be argued 
in respect to some Member States in specific policy areas. The relationship 
is usually labeled as paradoxical due to the Swiss not having any 
pretensions towards EU membership, but sustaining a broad range of 
bilateral agreements that have heavily established compliance of the Swiss 
legal framework with the EU’s and allowing for the high Europeanization 
of the government’s policy direction. There have been several phases of 
this complex relation that are analytically possible to disentangle providing 
for an impartial overview of different arrangements present in different 
contextual periods. First of which could be marked as multilateral phase 
characterized by many failures to frame solid connection with the 
Communities from 1955-1972, followed by period up to 1990s which is 
seen as a period of non-progress and visible stagnation due to specific 
circumstances happening on international stage, concluding with the 
fruitful period from 1993 to 2005 as a phase of comprehensive and 
strengthened bilateral relations, not taking into consideration the 
contemporary period which could be characterized by intensive 
collaboration and possible consideration of application for membership.34 
Hence, the key arrangements from each of the phases that have 
significantly contributed to the development of the Swiss-EU relation could 
be precisely traced, starting with the Free Trade Agreement signed in 1972 
enabling the construction of a free trade zone for industrial products, 
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following by the Insurance Agreement which has specifically defined 
extent liberalized insurance market, concluding with most substantial and 
comprehensive package of two Bilateral Agreements in 1999 and 2004 
which extended the area of collaboration to significant parts of 
Europeanized polices such as security, asylum and environment. 35 
Important to note is that citizens of Switzerland are the main source of 
sovereignty which is not only proclaimed as one of the principles in the 
legal order but it is often visible through direct participation on 
referendums keeping their government constrained and cautioned on 
undertaking radical changes in Swiss political, legal or economic system. 
However, voters of the Swiss confederation have never explicitly cast their 
ballots on the issue of application to join the EU, even though their 
government has expressed significant approval and tendency towards 
possible full-fledged integration on many occasions. One of the closest 
attempts to submit the question to a referendum about membership to the 
EU was in 1992, when the Swiss government intended to enter the 
European Economic Area (EEA) together with other remaining European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and afterwards to link it with the 
accession application to the EU. However, this was rejected by citizens and 
from that moment Switzerland came closer to the EU framework only 
through bilateral agreements. 
These bilateral agreements have integrated Switzerland much more than 
anyone could imagine. Statistically looking only at economic data, 80% of 
imports and around 60% of Swiss exports are derived from and to the EU, 
making it the third most significant trading partner of the Union. Moreover, 
it accounts for around €150 billion on annual basis in the extent of the 
bilateral trade as well in terms of investments. However, some of these 
figures show that the degree of the integration with the EU is much 
stronger than many Member States among each other. In terms of 
migration policy, the transit and passage of huge number of people crossing 
the borders between the EU countries and the Switzerland could be marked 
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on a regularly basis, while more than 20% of the people living in Swiss 
cities are EU citizens.36 
The comprehensive, constantly evolving and becoming wider and broader 
European integration had gradually directed its effect towards the legal 
setup as well as governance framework of Switzerland, putting it under 
pressure and under the inevitable scenario of accommodating its 
constitutional organization of the Confederation to a level acceptable for 
attaining the objectives agreed on the bilateral level. However, after the 
Second World War the priority of Switzerland was to unconditionally 
preserve the principle of neutrality, which was considered to be safeguard 
only to the level of the sovereignty held by Swiss authorities on federal or 
cantonal level. Regardless of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) formation in 1952, with the aim of assuring permanent peace and 
security among European countries, the Swiss government and people 
considered that the path of integration was contrary to principles inherent to 
Swiss Confederation; not the mere content of the integrative policies, but 
future aim of accomplishing ever closer union, which as a political aim was 
welcomed in Swiss public opinion. 
In 1960s, Switzerland found an alternative to the growing influence of the 
developing Communities was to enhance its economic performance in the 
creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Very soon, 
however, this was considered as not enough, comparing to the very fast 
economic advancement of Member States of the Communities in that 
period. Hence, the Federal Council, twenty years later, published a report 
on the possible creation of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
underlining that Communities must guarantee total protection of principle 
of neutrality, direct democracy and federalism if they want Switzerland to 
join. The agreement was signed in 1992 and only a few days later the 
application for joining the EU was submitted. However, the constellation of 
the relation on the international stage and factors within Switzerland have 
influenced the citizens who, according to the rights given in the 
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Constitution, voted on the EEA Agreement in a referendum, and notably 
refused it. Many reports recognized that this rejection was only the 
consequence of the application towards full-fledged membership and not 
due to a badly negotiated EEA Agreement. However, the Swiss decided to 
retain their sovereignty without having any aims of transferring 
competences to the EU institutions, but, knowingly or not, the agreement 
was not fully considered as the best solution. Currently, this is especially 
confirmed in the discussion raised by the Brexit. 37  However, the EEA 
Agreement was considered a good solution for Switzerland in terms that it 
would not constrain its general principles and would allow access to the 
benefits of the single market in respect to the four freedoms, but on the 
other hand had a very important effect which would have put the Swiss in 
the position of considering possible constraints on their sovereign rights in 
respect to the exclusion from decision-making process on those matters. 
Thus, the nature of the bilateral agreements was adjusted to the principles 
that have been a major source of shaping internal and external policy 
direction of Switzerland – neutrality, federalism and direct democracy, 
whose strong net has been lenient enough to let these agreements pass on 
the mandatory referendum with a majority of cantons voting in favor. 
Hence, there are two packages of bilateral agreements which deal with a 
wide range of economic policies heavily regulated on the EU level, but to a 
certain extent embodied with political integrative perspective. Truly, it is 
inevitable to preserve sovereignty when the integrative path of Switzerland 
is under the EU’s, to certain extent limited, but still strong influence. The 
first package of provisions in Bilateral I Agreement deals with wide range 
of sectors, particularly important for the Swiss government to have access 
to single market, in terms of land transport, public procurement, technical 
barriers to trade, research and to some not so attractive, but necessary to 
sustain whole agreement, free movement of persons and agriculture. On the 
other hand, Bilateral II deals with statistics, environment, education, but 
most importantly has incorporated provisions from the Schengen 
Agreement and Dublin Regulation. 
 
37  Ibid, 8-11. 
The Impact of European Integration on the Westphalian Concept of 
National Sovereignty 
29 
 
The implications of these agreements differ, but the most notable one is the 
deliberate sector reformation due to the necessity to adjust to the EU 
system in order to be able to pull significant benefits from the provisions 
agreed to. However, the Swiss have tried to avoid it with principle of 
integration à la carte where they have been able to sustain relations with 
the EU up to the level of its conformity.38 Nevertheless, even with the 
incremental approach towards integration in specifically defined sectors, 
the Swiss cannot completely argue that they keep direct control of their 
sovereignty. Interestingly, the comparative study was conducted where 
Swiss officials were examined on the specific feature of their role while 
implementing provisions from these bilateral agreements into Swiss legal 
framework in comparison to the implementation of the Swiss national 
policies. This questionnaire helped to come to a conclusion of the extent of 
EU influence on the internal Swiss structure and the manner of functioning. 
Hence, the implementation procedure through EU-Swiss Joint Committee 
heavily impacted Swiss having a say through expertise of different 
European interest groups and working units. Moreover, the room for 
maneuver of Swiss officials was severely constrained by the mere fact that 
any voluntary decision would put in danger whole bilateral project.39 
The level of actual independence of the Swiss government is questioned by 
several factors derived from substantially close relations with the EU; 
notably, the indirect effect on the Swiss decision-making process, the Swiss 
contribution to the EU budget and adherence to the EU legal order. Even 
though, Switzerland contributes to the EU budget and to certain extent 
participates in the EU funded projects, it cannot receive any funding for 
development of the least developed regions to improve their infrastructure 
and to keep up with the rest of the Europe. Moreover, the Swiss legal 
system is comprehensively influenced by the EU legal provisions in those 
areas which are defined in the bilateral agreements, and to some extent 
indirectly to those where there is no explicit measure, through more than 
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100 bilateral agreements. The perfect phrase was coined in order to explain 
how influential EU legislative mechanism is on the Swiss internal 
functioning which adapts its measures to the EU up to the point where it is 
possible to declare it a fax democracy. However, until now it is proven that 
the legislative acts adopted in the EP and Council are of strong importance 
even for third countries; the strongest argument which can sustain the 
statement regarding strict and visible impact on the Swiss sovereignty is the 
lack of voting powers in those main legislative EU institutions and 
impossibility to contribute and give its own input in order to express 
interest and adapt it to the domestic needs.40 
Moreover, with these bilateral agreements Switzerland had only negotiated 
parts of the EU single market, not covering the most important part of the 
service sector for the Swiss, the banking departments; which exercise huge 
pressure on that sector, moving it outside the Swiss environment, forcing 
banks to set subsidiaries in the EU and by default moving job positions, tax 
contributions and value creating outside Switzerland. Another barrier for 
complete utilization of the benefits from the established bilateral relation is 
the static nature of the agreements preventing the Swiss legal system to 
immediately adopt to the changes relating to single market.  
Another attempt which exemplified the nature of EU authority and the 
benefits Switzerland receives from the bilateral agreements that provide for 
non-negotiable compliance with the EU framework, is shown in the 
situation which occurred in 2014, when Swiss citizens voted in a 
referendum to restrict immigration, following Swiss government’s 
obligation to comply. In response to this situation the EU suspended high-
valued research grants, the Erasmus student exchange program and 
participation in Horizon 2020. The Swiss government knew that it could 
not completely and explicitly respond to the people’s choice (prevailed 
slightly above 50% with low turnout), due to a specific clause inserted in 
the bilateral agreements, the so called guillotine clause, which meant that if 
 
40  Bailey, James, Switzerland and Norway an Alternative to the EU Membership, One 
Europe, 2013, online at: http://one-europe.net/switzerland-and-norway-an-
alternative-to-eu-membership; last accessed: 31.07.2017. 
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any of the provisions was violated all of them would be condemned to 
failure, confirming Swiss dependency on the EU decision-making system.41 
“Those rules are not set in Bern. When EU leaders in Brussels discuss banking 
regulations or provisions on the EU’s passport-free Schengen Area – rules that 
directly affect Switzerland, the Swiss president is absent. The Swiss ambassador 
doesn’t get farther than the press room.”42 
This quotation perfectly addresses the reality in Swiss-EU relations where 
certain expressions of constraints of sovereignty is undeniable. Hence, this 
crisis between the EU and Switzerland lasted for almost two years, and it 
ended by the Swiss having to satisfy the EU demands, but of course not 
explicitly refusing wish of the people. According to the prominent 
newspaper dealing with the EU affairs, the EU Observer, the bill was 
adopted by the Swiss Parliament but without quotas imposed on the 
immigrants. 
Until now, bilateralism has constantly provided solutions for balancing the 
interest of the Swiss in terms of maintaining equilibrium between the extent 
of the integration and sovereignty, however, the time for sustaining that 
wise strategy of increasing the benefits from economic integration and at 
the same time minimizing the political disadvantages, has passed. It is 
important that Swiss citizens and officials have in mind that not joining the 
EU or abandoning current arrangements would not support recovery of 
already lost sovereignty. In the end, it is up to them to continue bilateral 
relations or to enhance the integration arrangements, bearing in mind that 
the EU has the stronger bargaining power. 
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citizens, The Guardian, 2016, online at: ttps://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/jul/03/eu-swiss-single-market-access-no-free-movement-citizens; last 
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4. Path of conditionality towards full-fledged 
membership – implications of the accession process 
on Montenegrin sovereignty 
This chapter will serve as a perfect concluding remark for analyzing the 
degree and intensity of EU integration on national sovereignty, how 
conditions set before candidate countries impact their sovereignty. Even 
though countries thrive to preserve their sovereignty, the constellation of 
international relations sets plethoric conditions of inter-dependency which 
disables countries to conduct their policies alone and requires them to 
surrender part of sovereignty for larger benefits and safety.  Hence, for a 
small country, like Montenegro, the intensity of globalized forces is felt 
much harder, there is no room for behaving only according to the 
government or citizens’ interest, but what bigger countries aim to achieve 
has to be taken into account. Long ago, in 2006 after regaining 
independence, the government of Montenegro set as the main aim for a 
bright Montenegrin future and survival, the path of European integration 
with a crucial focus on becoming an EU Member State. 
Montenegro’s first direct contact with the EU, after the independence 
referendum supervised by the EU (which was characterized as a very 
successful expression of democracy and the only one which resulted in 
peaceful separation on Balkan Peninsula), was the signing of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2007. It was the primary and 
comprehensive mechanism of EU conditionality and penetration in the 
national legal system, the specific feature of this agreement’s foundation 
consisted of the core provisions of the acquis comprising not only the EU 
primary legislation, but also the EU institutions’ acts as secondary 
legislation. Hence, the most prominent measures are prohibitions against 
custom duties, quantitative restrictions on exports and imports and for 
instance, competition rules. Thus, it is visible that the agreement framed the 
relation between the EU and third country, Montenegro, and has already 
shaped the principal-agent situation, where agent-Montenegro has agreed to 
pursue conditionality-compliance arrangements taking into account that it 
could invoke supranationality features and constrain its newly regained 
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sovereignty.43 However, the accession process is an extremely long and 
exhaustive path of plethoric nature of legal, economic and political 
conditions and provisions which in a given transitional period have to been 
incorporated into the national system, to be in accordance with the EU legal 
order. The Montenegrin path of conditionality officially started with the 
statement given at the EU Thessalonica Summit in 2003 that Serbia and 
Montenegro, as one state before, could apply for membership and become 
full-fledged members through a process of accession and compliance with 
necessary conditions.44 Important here is, that Montenegro, following the 
proclamation in the Declaration of Independency (2006), agreed to persist 
on the path of conditionality through the EU integration in order to be able 
to transform its society and system, to bring wealth, prosperity and 
security, and to provide strong pillars for the construction of democratic 
and independent institutions; decided to respect core EU values and 
surrender implicitly or explicitly part of its sovereignty. 
However, Montenegro cannot be withdrawn from the wider framework of 
other Balkan states, due to specific approach of the EU towards Western 
Balkan enlargement package. The same conditions will be applied in 
accession negotiations with other countries representing WB (Western 
Balkans)-6 group, notably Serbia, followed by Albania, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, will be 
applied as well, now on a Montenegrin accession attempt. That is why it is 
necessary to understand the environment in which Montenegro is trying to 
construct its state and to integrate into the wider community of developed 
countries, in order to be able to consider and analyze the conditions set as 
they are. The Balkans has a long history of ethnic conflicts and is 
considered a place of turmoil on the European continent. In respect of the 
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Europe saw 
unimaginable bloodshed and destruction, leaving behind week states 
incapable of carrying out recovery mechanisms to protect citizens and build 
from scratch broken institutions and inter-cultural relations. However, the 
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EU did not have mechanisms to prevent this, but eventually the offer which 
it has set before Balkan countries has changed their sense of thinking and 
has given them the motivation to persist on a path of transformation of their 
respective countries in terms of achieving democratic and economic 
standards cherished by the EU, in order to be able to reach the prize of 
membership. However, the conditions are stricter than ever before and any 
non-compliance is regarded as moving step away from the full-fledge 
participation in the EU project.  
“The EU conditionality can be more intrusive as it can intervene in the 
sovereignty of an aspiring candidate suggesting a redefinition of internal and/or 
external statehood structures.”45 
Moreover, it is interesting to analyze the role of the EU institutions which 
are involved in the accession process, exemplifying the supranational 
character of the European integration process through setting clear opinions 
for Montenegrin behavior in respect to its fulfillment of the conditions set 
before it. Hence, the Commission and the European Council are considered 
as major sources of political pressure exerted on the Montenegrin 
government, society and other stakeholders having interest, through 
providing opinion on Montenegrin progress and allowing for further steps 
in the negotiation process; it is obvious that the role of these institutions 
describes the exact nature of the Montenegrin (but also other countries’) 
accession path embodied in the high interference of an external entity 
enabling the limitation of sovereign powers.  
The main objective of the involvement of the EU into complex issues 
among Balkan neighbors is to provide peaceful solution for building states 
and ethnic reconciliation. In that regard, the EU conditionality system is 
supported by a wide range of requirements set by other organizations, in 
the Montenegrin case the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which erodes even more national sovereignty by duplicating the framework 
of conditions (mutually not exclusive) and the  extent of interference in 
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national affairs. However, the EU accession path consists of the costs 
incurred on the short run and benefits on the longer term and not every 
state is ready to unconditionally obey and carry out obligations, especially 
in case when political costs in the short run are too big such as completely 
reforming state institutions, while reducing possibilities of public servants 
to exert illegitimate powers from their positions.46 The EU power which it 
exerts on accession countries is enormous, but only up to the point of 
country’s approval; which implies equally to the issue of sovereignty.  
The submission of membership application (which Montenegro did in 
2008) is embodied with several sets of criteria, which have been 
comparatively developed throughout a long period. However, the progress 
on the path of accession for Montenegro is paved with progress on specific 
internal structures reformation as well as two main conditions which cannot 
be circumvented by any derogation, the enhancement of regional 
cooperation as a prerequisite for reconciliation of previously intolerant 
neighbors and on the other hand, the maintenance of the cooperative 
relation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslav 
countries. But, the long list of the conditions set before Montenegro to be 
conducted in good faith does not end here; the well-known Copenhagen 
criteria are basis of the whole EU enlargement process, that defines 
necessity of each candidate country to achieve recognizable degree of 
stability of its institutions which cherish human rights, rule of law and 
democracy; also to provide market driven economy which will be able to 
respond to competitive pressure that the EU’s single market sustains; last 
but not least, to be capable of undertaking necessary tasks in order to cope 
with obligations that come with membership. Following the year of 1995, 
new criterion were added in the Madrid Summit and it is most visible now 
in 2017 as 5th year since Montenegro has opened its negotiation chapters, 
the absorption capacity of the Union, which according to President Junker, 
currently is considered as negative. Finally, the Commission gave the green 
light for the membership application, but stressed the focal points on which 
Montenegro must work together with the EU institutions if it aspires 
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towards membership; notably, issues with corruption, organized crime and 
deficiencies in the functioning of mechanism for implementing the 
legislation in the institutions having trouble with democratic principles.47 
Remarkably, the accession of Montenegro, as well other Balkan countries, 
has been even more intensified, with the introduction of specific condition 
to primarily open 23rd and 24th chapters. This would create comprehensive 
mechanisms to efficiently and effectively incorporate Montenegro’s reform 
measures, but at the same time to ensure that core problems characterized 
by this enlargement period would be eradicated from the beginning, 
preventing the situation such as with Bulgaria or Romania from happening. 
These chapters are dealing with fundamental rights, domestic security and 
justice, and if progress on these chapters is not visible to a desired extent, 
other chapters could be delayed in opening, due to specifics of these 
chapters that have to be closed last.48 
The following 7th enlargement wave the process is very complex, with 
never ending requirements needed to be accomplished; so called 
Enlargement Plus Process with enhanced mechanisms founded on seven 
major principles which serve as guiding values of the negotiation 
procedure. Hence, Montenegro was the first country in this new 
enlargement period to enter the negotiation process under these newly 
defined conditions, principles and rules within the EU framework. The 
additional principles, called seven C, emphasize the priority of deepening 
that has been fostered, instead of widening as was in focus in previous 
accession negotiation periods. Among the first principles set are 
communication, consolidation and conditionality defined in 2005, which 
have strengthened the commitments specified in the enlargement process, 
enhanced the conditionality that became stricter and more comprehensive 
 
47  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
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and also have induced mechanisms for improving the communicational 
framework directed towards citizens aiming at providing information with 
regard to the enlargement process. On the other hand, the last four were 
defined in period 2009-2013 within different enlargement strategies 
stressing the importance of credibility of enlargement process; crisis which 
brings new focus of the Montenegrin accession and sets economic features 
at the fore, as a consequence of the financial crisis; moreover, concrete 
results are highly important if Montenegro wants to join the EU, it has to 
show improvement in areas defined with reform framework through track-
record mechanisms specified by the EU institutions; and lastly, the common 
priorities casting more light on reformation in fields of fundamental rights 
and media expression. Undoubtedly, Montenegro is considered primus 
inter pares when it comes to the level of accomplishment of the aims set in 
negotiation process and reforms conducted, in comparison to other 
countries that are negotiating or preparing for negotiations with the EU, 
emphasizing quality before speed.49 
However, Montenegro has shown enormous persistence on building strong 
and collaborative relations; with respect to that, it is the only country in the 
region which has not had any larger or serious conflict with any of its 
neighbors and it is usually said that it is currently the only country that is 
still in the game for prospective membership by representing a rare bright 
mark during very hard times for the EU. On top of all conditionality 
analyzed in the previous pages, it is also important to mention the powerful 
and supranational role of the EU Commission, which at the end of each 
year composes reports on Montenegro’s progress and unilaterally directly 
imposes further measures and rules that should be followed in order to 
receive positive opinion and possibility to move towards closure of the 
negotiation process. 
Hence, in regard to that, in the last 2016 report the Commission has marked 
Montenegrin progress on each area analyzed positively, however it also 
strictly emphasized the need for more comprehensive work on fighting 
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against organized crime and corruption, which are seen as major issues in 
the Montenegrin society, while, at the same time stressing the need for 
undertaking more austere measures to reduce public debt threatening to put 
in danger fiscal stability. 50 Thus, as it is not highly important for the 
analysis of this matter, the thorough elaboration of the report is not 
necessary, its purpose here is to show the extent of the implications of the 
EU framework and power of the EU institutions that are exerted on 
Montenegro and how that affects Montenegro’s internal system. The EU 
Commission with its authority clearly sets new direct conditions in terms of 
the necessary improvements that should be done and specifically defining 
them in order to be able to join the EU, which straightforwardly impose 
enormous burdens on country’s sovereignty, having to oblige and comply – 
due to free decisions made – to approach the community of developed 
countries. 
The statement made by the current ambassador of the EU in Montenegro, 
Mr. Orav, exemplifies the real reach of the EU institutional and legal setup 
into Montenegro’s national internal system, clearly arguing in favor of the 
starting assumption that the process of joining to some limited extent 
transforms or constrains sovereignty,  
“…thanks to the EU rules applied here in Montenegro, the food has become safer, 
and also toys for children. Through the introduction of the anti-corruption agency, 
Montenegrins have a dedicated address to turn to report corruption, while better 
equipment for farmers helps to increase the agricultural productivity”. 
This notes the degree of benefits brought by that process which clearly 
offset the costs incurred by the change in respect to the understanding of 
sovereignty. 
Montenegro has opened two new chapters on the intergovernmental 
conference in Luxembourg, namely 1 and 22, which deal with the freedom 
of movement of goods and regional policies, making the Montenegrin path 
through the negotiation process very close to the end, at least in regard of 
the opening of all chapters. Thus, indicating that for five years of 
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exhaustive negotiations with the EU, Montenegro has opened 28 from 35 
chapters, aligning itself completely with the rules applied in the EU in 
terms of trade, development and humanitarian aid, it is considered in those 
matters, as de facto part of the EU.51 
The EU has high and crucial significance for small countries, such as 
Montenegro. Indeed, the EU’s path of conditionality for providing full-
fledged membership to third countries (Montenegro) has a significant 
impact on country’s sovereignty, but on voluntary basis, and it is always 
possible to stop this process, as Iceland did. For Montenegro, the mere 
pulling of sovereignty on the EU level represents in symbolic terms greater 
gains of recognition of its sovereignty powers and rights, in so far as to 
prevent that 1918 never happens again – when Montenegro lost its 
independency and much more. As 2019 is approaching, the year of the EU 
elections in the EP and further the new Commission’s composition will be 
set, which represents a huge opportunity for Montenegro to specify the 
final year of the end of a long negotiation process, even more when 
Montenegro has shown its persistence on the path of NATO integrations 
and has become member, securing its path towards developed and 
progressive countries of the Europe. 
Conclusions and Future Prospects 
Hence, four chapters have given explicit response to the posed research 
questions, undoubtedly setting the scene for arguing that the era of the 
Westphalian system and sovereignty has passed, leaving behind a plethora 
of interplay among supranational and statehood entities, where the concept 
of sovereignty has been fading, allowing for a multilevel decision-making 
system. The EU is undeniably a specific and unique organization which 
radically changed the arrangements on which the states have been 
functioning for centuries, directly and implicitly transforming the 
functional idea and concept of national sovereignty. Thus, the far-reaching 
role of the EU’s institutions, most notably, the Commission and the ECJ, 
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have significantly contributed to the development of the legal system which 
is characterized by the principle of supremacy over national legal systems 
and which undoubtedly interfere within national domain of powers. Indeed, 
with its own exclusive powers and also in those areas where it shares 
competences with Member States, the EU sets rules and conditions which 
are submitted for compliance and incorporation by national authorities, 
providing for a harmonized framework of legal interpretation and 
application. Why is it argued that it has come to transformation and not to 
complete loss? The post-Westphalian era stopped in the very moment when 
first Communities were formed, marking the sovereignty a fluid concept, 
adjustable to the forces created in international sphere, still held strongly by 
the States, but to a significant extent shaped by decisions made from other 
entities, notably the EU. Hence, States cannot adopt laws and decisions 
anymore, without considering positions of the EU and other Member 
States, their neighbors, due to the high level of interdependency of all 
actors in this globalized world. This is the best explanation of how the 
concept of Westphalian sovereignty as a personification of unbreakable 
power of states, has come to the much looser forms of having several 
sovereigns within one territory. 
The analysis conducted in three chapters dealing with concrete examples of 
states influenced by the EU legal and institutional framework through 
different relations they thrive to maintain, has shown the great degree of the 
EU’s impact on the respective states internal architecture and by default, on 
their sovereignty. Hence, Germany has reacted on the need to pull 
sovereignty, through adjusting its Constitutional framework to the level 
where fundamentals of its constitutional and statehood identity would not 
be put in danger. Fostering European integration and its values, allowing a 
significant level of supranational influence resulting in a transformation of 
its sovereignty, but still holding main powers for itself. On the other hand, 
interestingly, Switzerland has maintained a different kind of contact with 
the EU, but still is undoubtedly been exposed to the impact of the EU legal 
order, especially in terms of trade and migration. However, the bilateralism 
to which the Swiss have pursued, has not prevented the substantial erosion 
of Swiss sovereignty, leading to the argument that even states that did not 
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want to enter the EU with the aim of preserving their sovereignty, cannot 
be left untouched by some provisions established on the EU level. Last, but 
not least, the fourth chapter points out that countries attempting to join the 
EU, such as Montenegro, under the framework of constant and complex 
conditionality, is directly submitted to the legal provisions envisaged in 
primary and secondary legislation of the EU, which have to be directly 
transposed into national systems and conducted a plethora of reforms in 
order to be able to fulfill long list of criteria needed to become full-fledged 
member of the EU; influencing Montenegrin sovereignty in a significant 
manner that allows for opening of the internal system for the supranational 
order which in the end is benefits Montenegrin citizens.  
The hypothesis of the transformation of sovereignty under European 
integration has been confirmed, and the best exemplification is the 
following statement, which has significantly adjusted the concept of 
national sovereignty:  
“Sovereignty is a manifestation of the new order in a globalized world where 
economies and decision-making processes become interdependent and some 
responsibility has shifted from the national states to another centers of 
governance. State sovereignty, acquires a new dimension in connection with 
European integration. Today, a sovereign should be well able to organize the 
performance of the society, to tolerate the realms of fragmentation, integration and 
globalization.”52 
Nevertheless, changes in the European Union are happening very fast, 
rendering it almost impossible to predict the long-term future prospects. 
However, theoretically, it is possible to assume that crises that have hit the 
EU are going to have strong implications on the future understanding of 
sovereignty and it is highly likely that the structure and function of the EU 
will be changed, by default impacting relations with the Member States and 
other third countries. Indeed, the financial crisis, due to which we even now 
see the phases of recovery, terrorist attacks which are continuing, migration 
problems and well-known Brexit, all exert decisive impact on the perceived 
degree of delegation of powers among Member States to the EU 
institutions, where we more and more have to consider problems of 
withdrawing sovereignty through incremental steps, most notably seen 
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through the actions of Poland and Hungary. However, the only possible 
path towards offsetting these issues is envisaged in the unfading motto of 
the EU – united in diversity. 
This paper will avoid any possible speculations about future prospects, it 
will only recall the existence of five scenarios composed by the 
Commission in the White Paper emerging as potential directions for further 
developments by 2025; which could allow for opening new chapter of 
analysis with regard to the impact of the EU integration on sovereignty, due 
to specific feature of each of five scenarios and the volume of different 
implications to the Member States’ sovereignty. However, in the end, the 
window of opportunities is open, now it is up to the Member States and the 
EU to define further their framework of functioning. 
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